Direct Procurement from Farmers: Most Viable Models Commodity Buyers Can Run in India

RYSENTIA KNOWLEDGE SERIES | SOURCING INTELLIGENCE

Rysentia | A Food & Agribusiness Value Chain Solutions Company | November 2026 | Reading time: about 20 minutes

Scope, definitions and assumptions

Every assumption used in this paper is stated here, so that readers can test it against their own situation.

1. Audience. The paper is written for procurement heads and sourcing leaders at Indian and international food, ingredient and consumer companies. It assumes familiarity with Indian agricultural marketing and does not explain basic terms.
2. Definition of direct procurement. Buying from the farmer, or from a farmer-owned or farmer-linked entity, without passing through the traditional chain of commission agents, traders and wholesalers. The buyer may still use logistics providers.
3. Definition of viable. A model is treated as viable if it delivers the required quality at repeatable volume and an acceptable landed cost, without depending on a single individual or on continuing subsidy. This is our working definition, not a regulatory one.
4. Volume. All four models carry fixed costs. We assume the buyer has recurring, multi-season demand for the commodity. We have not set a numerical volume threshold because none of the cited sources supports one.
5. Evidence standard. Figures are quoted as published, with the date of the source. Where a figure comes from a company, an investor or a trade article rather than an independent study, the text says so. Where company web pages are undated, we give the date on which they were accessed (9 November 2026).
6. Pros and cons. Items that carry a footnote reflect a cited source. Items without a footnote are Rysentia’s analytical judgement from sourcing practice and should be read as such, not as research findings.
7. Regulation. Agricultural marketing is regulated at state level in India and the position changes. Nothing here is legal advice. Buyers should confirm the current rules in each state of operation.
8. Success stories. One documented example is given for each model. They are chosen because they are reasonably well documented, not because they are typical. Outcomes elsewhere may differ.
9. Illustrative cases. Rysentia’s own use cases in the closing section are illustrative and come from the company profile. They are not independent evidence.
10. Classification. The four-way classification is ours. In practice the models overlap, and many successful programmes combine two or more.

1. Why should commodity buyers buy directly from farmers?

The primary reason that commodity buyers think of is the expectation of a lower price. However, using price as a starting point for going direct from farmer may be a flawed approach.

The Reserve Bank of India’s 2025 survey of the agricultural supply chain during the rabi marketing season reports that farmers’ share in the consumer price ranged from 40 to 67 per cent across the crops covered, with non-perishables generally higher than perishables. Wheat showed the highest share at 67 per cent, followed by lentil at about 66 per cent, gram at about 60 per cent, and rice and rapeseed and mustard at about 52 per cent.¹ For fruits and vegetables the same survey reports a combined range of 40 to 63 per cent, with the trader and retailer share together above half for all surveyed fruits and vegetables except tomato.² An earlier RBI working paper, as summarised by Business Standard, put farmers’ share at roughly one third of the consumer price for tomato, onion and potato taken together, against about 70 per cent in dairy.³⁴

One should not take these shares as a saving available to the buyer. The consumer price includes the retailer’s margin, wastage and the cost of services, functions that are essential in the value chain. The same RBI survey reports retailer mark-ups of roughly 7 to 25 per cent and trader mark-ups of 5 to 23 per cent, and finds that perishables carry higher mark-ups than non-perishables.⁵ Those mark-ups pay for storage, transport, credit and risk. A buyer who goes direct inherits those tasks.

What buyers actually gain by going direct

The strongest case for direct sourcing is control rather than arbitrage. FAO’s review of contract farming lists the advantages to the sponsoring company as more dependable supply than buying on the open market, more uniform quality, and simpler quality and quarantine inspection.⁶ In our assessment these translate into five practical benefits:

• Specification control. Variety, harvest timing, drying and residue management can be set at the farm, instead of being corrected at the factory gate.
• Traceability and proof of origin. Lot-level records back to the farmer are far easier when there is no trader in between.
• Supply reliability. Relationships and assured offtake give the buyer priority access when supply tightens.
• Cost visibility. A buyer can see the true cost build-up from farm to plant and challenge each element.
• Farmer-level development. Training and inputs can be tied to the buyer’s own quality requirements.

There is also evidence of procurement-cost savings where the model is well designed. An academic case study of ITC’s e-Choupal, based mainly on secondary sources, reports procurement costs falling from an industry standard of about 8 per cent to about 2 per cent, shared between the farmer and ITC.⁷ The study is small and dated, and the figure should be read as indicative.

Why the timing is favourable

Policy has moved towards giving farmers choice of buyer. The Centre’s Model APMC Act of 2003 provided that growers were under no compulsion to sell through regulated markets and allowed direct purchase centres and contract farming, and a draft Agricultural Produce and Livestock Marketing Act followed in 2017.⁸⁹ These were model laws, so adoption depends on each state. Separately, the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare reported 10,000 Farmer Producer Organisations registered under the central scheme as on 1 March 2026, and the scheme has been reported as due for a five-year extension.¹⁰¹¹ Buyers and FPOs are also being brought together directly: Ministry-level discussions with Olam, bigbasket, Britannia, Flipkart and Country Delight were reported in 2026.¹²

2. Models of direct farm procurement

The four models differ mainly in who owns the touchpoint with the farmer. In a collection centre, it is the buyer. In an FPC, it is a farmer-owned company. In the village entrepreneur model, it is a local individual acting for the buyer. In the NGO and trust model, it is an institution that builds the farmer organisation before a buyer commits. The comparison table at the end of this section summarises the trade-offs.

2.1 Collection centre model

How it works

The buyer sets up weighing, testing and payment points close to the farms, staffs them, and pays the farmer directly on a fixed cycle. Produce moves from the centre to the buyer’s hub or plant on scheduled logistics. The buyer bears the capital and operating cost of the centre and in return controls quality at the first point of purchase.

Pros

• Direct control of grading, testing and rejection at the point of purchase, which prevents poor lots from travelling to the plant.
• Predictable payment cycles build farmer loyalty. FAO identifies late payments and unfair buying as drivers of farmer discontent and withdrawal.¹³
• Supports perishables, where collection within hours matters. Retailers pass wastage costs on more readily for perishables, which indicates how much value is at stake.¹⁴
• A natural platform for extension, inputs and training once trust is established.

Cons

• Capital and operating cost sit with the buyer, and utilisation depends on enough supply density around each centre.
• Working capital is needed to pay on schedule, regardless of when the buyer sells.
• Side-selling: FAO notes that farmers may sell to other buyers at higher prices, and that input diversion and competition between buyers can follow.¹⁵
• Quality disputes can damage trust if testing is not transparent. The CEEW case study of e-Choupal records that laboratory testing exposed farmers to exploitation in that system.¹⁶

Success story: Nestlé India, Moga district

Nestlé’s Moga factory in Punjab began operations on 15 November 1961, with 180 farmers from four villages supplying 511 kg of milk on the first day.¹⁷ The company describes the model today as direct milk procurement supported by milk collection centres, cold chain and twice-daily collection, with prompt fortnightly payments, and reports a community of 100,000 farmers and a milk intake of 1.2 million kg a day.¹⁸ Academic authors report payments to farmers rising from Rs 910,000 in 1962 to over Rs 6,120 million by 2010-11.¹⁹

Data caution. Nestlé’s web pages are undated and are not fully consistent with each other: another page gives slightly different farmer and volume figures.²⁰ The payment figures come from an opinion article based on a book by the authors, and have not been audited. The model is also a 60-year build by a multinational, so the timeline is not a benchmark for a mid-sized buyer.

2.2 Farmer Producer Company model

How it works

Farmers become shareholders in a company that aggregates, grades, processes and markets their produce, and the buyer contracts with the company instead of with individual farmers. The buyer deals with one counterparty with a board, a balance sheet and, in the better cases, professional management. India now has a large FPO ecosystem: 10,000 FPOs were reported registered under the central scheme by 1 March 2026.²¹

Pros

• One counterparty replaces thousands of farmers, which lowers contracting and monitoring effort.
• The company can add processing, grading and packing, so the buyer receives a product closer to specification.
• Farmer ownership aligns incentives: members benefit from the company’s performance, which tends to improve loyalty.
• Access to government and development support. The Ministry’s scheme exists to build these organisations at scale.²²

Cons

• Quality of FPCs varies widely, and governance, capital and professional expertise are the recurring constraints noted in the research literature on long-term FPO viability.²³
• Capital structure can limit growth. Sahyadri (below) could not take in private equity as an FPC and restructured part of its business to do so.²⁴
• Corporate influence can dilute the farmer-owned character. Down To Earth has argued that big corporations with power over FPCs risk diluting their purpose.²⁵
• Building a credible FPC takes years, so it is slower than the other models unless a mature FPC already exists.

Success story: Sahyadri Farms, Nashik

Sahyadri began in 2004 with 10 grape farmers and was registered as a Farmers Producer Company in 2011 with 110 members.²⁶ It has since grown to cover eight crops, including grapes, pomegranates, bananas, mangoes, citrus, cashew, tomatoes and sweetcorn, and offers sorting, grading, packing and freezing, along with digital advisory and traceability tools.²⁷ Reported turnover was Rs1,549 crore in FY2023-24, and the company’s investor interview cites a figure of nearly Rs 2,500 crore for FY26.²⁸²⁹

Data caution. Member counts differ between sources: the investor interview itself gives 22,500 members in one place and over 30,000 in another.³⁰ The interview is published by an investor in the business, so it is an interested source. Founder-reported price outcomes, such as the realisation per kilogram quoted in a 2021 profile, are not independently verified and are not repeated here.³¹ Sahyadri should be read as one strong example, not as the typical outcome for an FPC.

2.3 Village entrepreneur model

How it works

A trained local person, typically a progressive farmer or a small trader, acts as the buyer’s agent in the village. The entrepreneur provides price information, aggregates produce and is paid a commission on the transactions facilitated, while the buyer sets the price, tests the produce and pays the farmer directly. A hub or transport agent moves the produce to the plant.

Pros

• Low fixed cost per village, because the entrepreneur uses their own premises and relationships. The CEEW case study records ITC’s cost as between USD 3,000 and USD 6,000 to install each unit and about USD 100 a year to maintain it.³²
• Local trust and knowledge of farmers, soils and timing that a buyer’s own staff would take years to build.
• Scales through replication across villages once the playbook is proven.
• Transparent daily price information gives the farmer a basis to compare offers, which can improve acceptance of the buyer.³³

Cons

• Dependence on individuals. The same CEEW study notes that sanchalaks came to be seen by some farmers as sellers rather than fellow farmers, which created distance.³⁴
• Physical delivery still relies on intermediaries who provide storage, transport and counterparty risk management, which the e-Choupal model did not replicate.³⁵
• Regulatory exposure. State law at the time prohibited buying outside the regulated mandis, which required government engagement, and a later production decline led to state stock limits on traders, affecting procurement.³⁶
• Competition from other information sources. The same academic study notes that commodity exchanges and text-message price services give farmers alternatives to the buyer’s price feed.³⁷

Success story: ITC e-Choupal

ITC launched e-Choupal in 2000 with a pilot among soybean farmers at Khasrod in Madhya Pradesh. A trained sanchalak hosts the e-Choupal at home, farmers can see the day’s prices, and the sanchalak earns a commission on transactions facilitated. Each e-Choupal serves up to about 600 farmers, with larger hubs handling cash, paperwork, produce and logistics.³⁸ ITC currently describes about 6,100 installations covering over 35,000 villages and over 4 million farmers.³⁹ ITC’s own sustainability material presents this as a farmer empowerment programme.⁴⁰

Data caution. The ITC figure is from an undated company page, and ITC’s FY2008-09 annual report, as summarised by MediaNama, recorded a scaling down of commodity operations in that year, so the programme has not been a straight line.⁴¹ The ITC e-Choupal concept has also been extended outside ITC: the Agri-Entrepreneur Growth Foundation, a collaboration of Tata Trusts and Syngenta Foundation India, applies a related village entrepreneur approach.⁴²

2.4 Foundations, NGOs and trusts

How it works

A foundation, trust or NGO, usually funded by philanthropy, CSR or government, mobilises farmers, trains them, introduces certification and builds producer groups or a producer company. The buyer then signs an offtake agreement with an organisation that already has discipline in grading and record keeping. The NGO’s role is to de-risk the early years and then step back. Development organisations have documented this role in India and elsewhere.⁴³⁴⁴

Pros

• Reduces buyer risk in the early years, because the institution carries the mobilisation and training cost.
• Brings farmers who may not otherwise be reachable, along with government convergence on irrigation and other support. The Mathematica evaluation of the APC programme in Odisha credits convergence with improved irrigation access.⁴⁵
• Credible on inclusion and sustainability, which supports certification and reporting needs.
• Can prepare farmer organisations that later contract with several buyers, which spreads the risk for the farmers.

Cons

• Dependence on funding cycles. The Mathematica evaluation notes that longer-term sustainability needs a clear financing mechanism for field-level support roles, and that FPOs need linkages to formal finance and renewed member engagement.⁴⁶
• The NGO’s objectives may not match the buyer’s commercial timeline or specification.
• Pace and geography are set by the funder’s programme, not by the buyer’s plant location.
• Outcomes depend on the quality of the partner, so due diligence on the NGO matters.

Success story: PRADAN and the Agricultural Production Cluster programme, Odisha

The Bharat Rural Livelihoods Foundation, an autonomous organisation under the Ministry of Rural Development, worked with the Government of Odisha, PRADAN and 17 civil society partners on the Agricultural Production Cluster programme.⁴⁷ The design organises farmers into producer groups of about 150 farmers on about 40 contiguous acres, with 20 to 25 groups federated into a producer company.⁴⁸ An independent evaluation by Mathematica for the Gates Foundation covered the period 2020 to 2024. It reports 932 producer groups and 32 producer companies, market access for more than 122,000 female small-scale producers, and average annual net agricultural income about 40 per cent higher than a comparison group after four years, and about 70 per cent higher for highly engaged members.⁴⁹

Data caution. This is an evaluation of the farmers’ outcomes, not of a buyer’s procurement economics, and it was prepared for the programme’s funder. The programme targets inclusion first, so the example shows what the institutional groundwork can achieve for the farmer side of a deal. Buyers should treat it as evidence on aggregation capability, not as proof of procurement savings. A separate USAID-funded assessment of the GMED India project on linking small vegetable farmers to supermarkets provides a further reference for NGO-bridged retail linkages.⁵⁰

2.5 Comparing the four models

The table below is Rysentia’s assessment, drawn from the evidence above and from sourcing practice. It is a starting point for discussion and should be adjusted for each commodity and region.

Dimension	Collection centre	Farmer Producer Company	Village entrepreneur	NGO or trust-led
Who owns the farmer touchpoint	Buyer	Farmer-owned company	Local individual, buyer-linked	NGO, then farmer groups
Buyer capital need	High	Low to medium	Low	Low
Speed to first supply	Medium	Fast if a mature FPC exists; slow otherwise	Medium to fast	Slow
Control over quality	Highest	Medium to high	Medium	Medium, builds over time
Main risk	Fixed cost, side-selling	Governance, capital	Dependence on individuals	Funding cycles, pace
Best suited to	Perishables, high-value or quality-sensitive crops	Crops needing grading and processing	Dispersed smallholders, price-transparent crops	New origins, inclusive or certified supply
Documented example	Nestlé, Moga	Sahyadri Farms	ITC e-Choupal	PRADAN, Odisha APC

3. Which commodities are suitable for direct farmer procurement?

Suitability should be tested commodity by commodity. FAO’s list of preconditions for successful contract farming includes a market that can be supplied profitably over the long term, farmer returns that beat alternatives with equal or lower risk, reliable access to inputs, a legal framework that supports agreements, and a sponsor with financial strength and proven management.⁵¹ We adapt these into a ten-point checklist for buyers.

Ten-point suitability checklist

1. Recurring demand. You need the commodity every season, at volumes that justify fixed cost.
2. Farm-level quality drivers. Quality is set by variety, harvest timing, drying or residue practice that a buyer can influence at source.
3. Measurable at the gate. Moisture, grade, residue or contaminant limits can be tested objectively, to avoid disputes.
4. A margin to share. Intermediaries currently take a meaningful mark-up. The RBI survey shows mark-ups vary widely by crop.⁵²
5. Perishability fits your logistics. If the crop is perishable, you can collect and move it within the time it holds quality.
6. Geographic clustering. Production is concentrated enough to keep collection distances and costs sensible. The Odisha programme, for instance, organises farmers into contiguous acreage.⁵³
7. Farmer return beats the alternative. The farmer must earn more net than selling elsewhere, otherwise side-selling follows.⁵⁴⁵⁵
8. Regulatory clarity. Your commodity and state allow direct purchase, and you are not competing head-on with an active public procurement price. (This is our judgement, and we have not quantified the effect of public procurement for each crop.)
9. Input and extension capability. You or a partner can supply seed, advice and testing on time.⁵⁶
10. Sponsor capability. Your organisation can fund working capital and sustain the commitment over several seasons.⁵⁷

Examples

Commodity group	Why it may suit direct procurement	Likely models	Evidence and caution
Milk	Perishable, twice-daily collection, quality set at the farm	Collection centre	Nestlé Moga.58 Farmers already get about 70 per cent of the final price,59 so the case rests on quality and reliability more than price.
Fruits (grapes, bananas, mangoes)	Quality varies by grower; grading and packing add value; export specifications reward traceability	FPC, collection centre	Sahyadri.60 The RBI has published a value chain study on grapes, bananas and mangoes.61
Tomato, onion, potato	Large intermediary share, price volatile	FPC, collection centre, with processor offtake	Farmers get about one third of the retail price.6263 Highly perishable and volatile, so execution risk is high.
Soybean, wheat and other grains and pulses	Storable, standard grades, price discovery possible at the village level	Village entrepreneur, FPC	ITC e-Choupal began with soybean.64 Farmers’ share is already higher (wheat 67 per cent, lentil about 66 per cent),65 so the margin to capture is smaller.
Peanuts (groundnuts) and other crops with contamination risk	Aflatoxin is driven by harvest, drying and storage practice at the farm and aggregator level	Existing channel fix, village entrepreneur, FPC	Rysentia illustrative case from the company profile; not independent evidence.66
Organic or certified produce for export, for example organic banana for puree	Compliance requires traceability to farmer cluster	NGO or trust-led, FPC	Rysentia illustrative case from the company profile; not independent evidence.67

4. Stress-testing the case for direct procurement

A balanced paper should also set out where direct procurement disappoints. We see five recurring points.

• Intermediation is a service, not only a margin. The e-Choupal study shows that even a flagship direct model continued to rely on intermediaries for storage, transport and counterparty risk.⁶⁸
• Side-selling and input diversion are structural. FAO lists both as standing problems for sponsors, and notes that good monitoring and realistic input quantities help.⁶⁹
• Counterparty concentration. A single FPC or a single entrepreneur can become a point of failure. FAO also flags the risk of manipulating quotas and quality standards when one buyer dominates, which can damage trust on the farmer side.⁷⁰
• Regulation and policy shocks. ITC’s experience of state stock limits and the legal prohibition on buying outside mandis shows that rules can change the economics quickly.⁷¹
• Where farmers already capture most of the price, the price case weakens. In dairy, farmers are reported to receive around 70 per cent of the final price,⁷² so direct models there rest on quality and reliability.

None of these argues against direct procurement. They argue for starting with a pilot, defining the cost and quality indicators in advance, and choosing the model that fits the commodity and the buyer’s capability.

5. How Rysentia can help

Rysentia is a food and agribusiness value chain solutions company that works on the ground with clients to run real projects in under-served agricultural commodities. Our three service lines map directly onto the decisions in this paper.⁷³

Stage	What we do	Relevance to direct procurement
Intelligence	ChainScan: complete cost breakdown and value build-up from farmer level. Value Chain Challenge RCA: root cause analysis of quality, cost, availability or grade issues.	Establishes whether a direct model is worth pursuing, which commodity, which cluster and which model, before capital is committed.
Sourcing	New Supplier Arrangement, Quality and Proof-of-Origin systems, Existing Channel Fix, and Farmer and Trader Development Programs.	Builds the farmer or FPC channel, sets up traceability and trains farmers and traders to your specification.
Fulfilment	Managed Procurement: a dedicated sourcing team, with process ownership of supplier relationship, quality checks and logistics.	Runs the channel day to day, so you do not have to hire and train an in-house team before the model is proven.

You can engage us in two ways. A Focused Mandate addresses one problem statement and delivers a findings report, a developed supply channel or ongoing managed sourcing, with no commitment beyond the agreed scope. An End-to-End Engagement moves from Intelligence to Sourcing to Fulfilment, with a pre-agreed number of pilots and delivery of the commodity for three years, renewable by mutual agreement. You choose the level of commitment without any obligation to move to the next stage.⁷⁴

Our illustrative cases include an international buyer building a verified second origin for organic banana puree, an emerging Indian brand setting up cardamom sourcing, and a large FMCG company fixing aflatoxin-related lot rejections in an existing channel.⁷⁵ These are Rysentia’s own examples and should be treated as descriptions of capability rather than independent evidence.

Frequently asked questions

What is direct farm procurement?

It is buying from farmers, or from farmer-owned or farmer-linked entities, without passing through the traditional chain of commission agents, traders and wholesalers. In practice the buyer or a partner takes over aggregation, grading, transport and payment.

Can a company legally buy directly from farmers outside the mandi?

The Centre’s 2003 Model APMC Act removed compulsion on growers to sell through regulated markets and provided for direct purchase centres, but these were model laws and adoption is for each state.⁷⁶⁷⁷ Confirm the current state position with a legal adviser before committing capital.

Does direct procurement always lower cost?

No. Intermediaries perform storage, transport, credit and risk functions, and the buyer takes these on. The stronger and more reliable benefits are quality control, traceability and supply assurance. Savings are possible where mark-ups are high, as in some perishables, but should be tested through a cost build-up first.⁷⁸⁷⁹

Which model should a mid-sized buyer start with?

It depends on the commodity. Where a mature FPC exists for your crop and region, contracting with it is usually the quickest. Where none exists and quality is critical, a small collection centre or village entrepreneur pilot gives more control. Where the origin is new, an NGO partnership can de-risk the early years. This is our judgement, not a finding of a cited study.

How long does it take to set up a direct procurement channel?

There is no reliable benchmark. Published cases such as Nestlé Moga and Sahyadri took years to mature.⁸⁰⁸¹ A pilot with a defined cluster and measurable quality targets can show early signals within a season or two, which is our judgement rather than a cited figure.

Notes on sources

All sources are given in the footnotes. Where a source is a company, investor or trade publication, or where the original could not be retrieved directly (the RBI College of Agricultural Banking case study on Sahyadri), this is stated in the note and the point should be verified against the original before the paper is quoted in a formal document.

1. Das, R., Kumar, R., Sethi, M., Shandilya, L.K. and Sebastian, A. (2025), ‘Dynamics of Agriculture Supply Chain: Insights from Pan India Survey during Rabi Marketing Season’, RBI Bulletin, 19 February 2025, Department of Economic and Policy Research, Reserve Bank of India. https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewBulletin.aspx?Id=23198 ↩︎
2. RBI Bulletin, February 2025 (Das et al.) (full reference at note 1). ↩︎
3. Roy, R. et al. (2024), ‘Vegetables Inflation in India: A Study of Tomato, Onion and Potato (TOP)’, RBI Working Paper Series No. 08, Reserve Bank of India. https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=22723 ↩︎
4. Business Standard (Capital Market), 4 October 2024, ‘RBI study shows tomato, onion and potato farmers get only a third of retail price that consumer pays’, summarising RBI Working Paper No. 08. The dairy figure (around 70 per cent) is as reported in this summary. https://www.business-standard.com/amp/markets/capital-market-news/rbi-study-shows-tomato-onion-and-potato-farmers-get-only-a-third-of-retail-price-that-consumer-pays-124100400307_1.html ↩︎
5. RBI Bulletin, February 2025 (Das et al.) (full reference at note 1). ↩︎
6. Eaton, C. and Shepherd, A.W. (2001), Contract Farming: Partnerships for Growth, FAO Agricultural Services Bulletin 145, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Chapter 1, ‘Advantages and problems of contract farming’ (sections on advantages for, and problems faced by, sponsors). https://www.fao.org/3/y0937e/y0937e03.htm ↩︎
7. Tewari, A., Ghosh, P. and Sangwan, S. (2012), ‘Creating Procurement Efficiencies in Agribusiness in India’, Management and Production Engineering Review, 3(3), pp. 63 to 70. Secondary data plus interviews with 30 convenience-sampled participants. https://journals.pan.pl//Content/89263/PDF/8-Tewari.pdf ↩︎
8. Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, reply in Parliament on the Model State Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2003 (salient features: no compulsion on growers to sell through regulated markets; direct purchase centres; institutional support for contract farming), Parliament Digital Library. https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/525728/1/26273.pdf ↩︎
9. Business Standard (IANS), 24 April 2017, ‘Centre’s new law aims at agricultural reforms, clips APMC wings’, on the draft Agricultural Produce and Livestock Marketing (Promotion and Facilitation) Act, 2017. https://business-standard.com/article/news-ians/centre-s-new-law-aims-at-agricultural-reforms-clips-apmc-wings-117042401384_1.html ↩︎
10. Capital Market (JM Financial), 18 March 2026, reporting a Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare update: 10,000 FPOs registered under the Central Sector Scheme as on 1 March 2026. https://www.jmfinancialservices.in/market-news-and-insights/1682101 ↩︎
11. Press Trust of India via Daily Excelsior, 12 December 2025, ‘Govt to extend FPO scheme for five years, address compliance and capital hurdles’ (statement by the Agriculture Secretary). https://www.dailyexcelsior.com/?p=2119176 ↩︎
12. e-Dairy News (web article, 2026; undated on page), ‘Farmers’ collectives team up with corporate sector’, reporting Ministry of Agriculture buyer-FPO discussions with Olam, bigbasket, Britannia, Flipkart, Country Delight and others. https://in.edairynews.com/?p=119134 ↩︎
13. FAO Bulletin 145 (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001), Chapter 1 (full reference at note 6). ↩︎
14. RBI Bulletin, February 2025 (Das et al.) (full reference at note 1). ↩︎
15. FAO Bulletin 145 (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001), Chapter 1 (full reference at note 6). ↩︎
16. Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW), E-Choupal Project case study, Framework for India’s Sustainable Agriculture Initiatives. https://www.ceew.in/sites/default/files/e-choupal-case-study.pdf ↩︎
17. Biswas, A.K. and Tortajada, C. (10 December 2015), opinion article in Sanchar Express, based on Biswas, A.K., Tortajada, C., Biswas, A. and Joshi, Y.K. (2013), Creating Shared Value Impacts of Nestlé in Moga, India, Springer. Volume, payment and multiplier figures are the authors’ own. https://thirdworldcentre.org/?p=1299 ↩︎
18. Nestlé India, ‘Farm economics: Milk district model’ (company web page, undated; accessed 9 November 2026). https://nestle.in/csv/rural-livelihoods/farm-economics ↩︎
19. Biswas and Tortajada (2015) (full reference at note 17). ↩︎
20. Nestlé India, ‘Dairy farmers’ (company web page, undated; accessed 9 November 2026), and Nestlé India milk farmers case study (collection area and collection centre count). https://www.nestle.in/csv/communities/dairy-farmers ; https://www.nestle.in/csv/case-studies/milk-farmers ↩︎
21. Capital Market, 18 March 2026 (Ministry of Agriculture update) (full reference at note 10). ↩︎
22. PTI via Daily Excelsior, 12 December 2025 (full reference at note 11). ↩︎
23. Suresh, et al. (2024), Frontiers in Sociology, DOI 10.3389/fsoc.2024.1415725, on the long-term viability of Farmer Producer Organisations (capital, professional expertise, governance). https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsoc.2024.1415725/full ↩︎
24. Incofin Investment Management (9 April 2026), ‘When farmers own the company: The Sahyadri Farms story’, interview with Vilas Shinde. Incofin is an investor in Sahyadri Farms Post Harvest Care Ltd, so this is an interested source. https://incofin.com/when-farmers-own-the-company-the-sahyadri-farms-story/ ↩︎
25. Down To Earth (web article, undated on page; reports FPC formation between November 2022 and February 2023), ‘Heavy sway: Big corporations with power over farmer producer companies is diluting their purpose’. https://www.downtoearth.org.in/governance/heavy-sway-big-corporations-with-power-over-farmer-producer-companies-is-diluting-their-purpose-88864 ↩︎
26. Incofin (2026), Sahyadri Farms interview (full reference at note 24). ↩︎
27. Incofin (2026), Sahyadri Farms interview (full reference at note 24). ↩︎
28. AgroSpectrum India (3 October 2024), ‘Sahyadri Farms achieves the turnover of Rs 15,489 Mn in FY 2023-24’. https://agrospectrumindia.com/2024/10/03/sahyadri-farms-achieves-the-turnover-of-rs-15489-mn-in-fy-2023-24.html ↩︎
29. Incofin (2026), Sahyadri Farms interview (full reference at note 24). ↩︎
30. Incofin (2026), Sahyadri Farms interview (full reference at note 24). ↩︎
31. The Weekend Leader (27 August 2021), ‘With Rs 1 lakh and a dream to better the lives of farmers, he built a Rs 525 crore turnover agricultural company’. Price figures are the founder’s own statement. https://www.theweekendleader.com/Video/2992/the-rich-farmer.html ↩︎
32. CEEW e-Choupal case study (full reference at note 16). ↩︎
33. CEEW e-Choupal case study (full reference at note 16). ↩︎
34. CEEW e-Choupal case study (full reference at note 16). ↩︎
35. Tewari, Ghosh and Sangwan (2012) (full reference at note 7). ↩︎
36. CEEW e-Choupal case study (full reference at note 16). ↩︎
37. Tewari, Ghosh and Sangwan (2012) (full reference at note 7). ↩︎
38. CEEW e-Choupal case study (full reference at note 16). ↩︎
39. ITC Limited, e-Choupal description on ITC Analytical Services web page (undated; about 6,100 installations, over 35,000 villages, over 4 million farmers). https://www.itcportal.com/itc-analytical-services/index.html ↩︎
40. World Business Council for Sustainable Development, ‘ITC’s farmer empowerment program, India’. https://wbcsd.org/resources/itcs-farmer-empowerment-program-india ↩︎
41. MediaNama (2009), ‘e-Choupal: ITC scaled down commodities, launched Tamil portal in FY09’, summarising ITC’s annual report for FY2008-09. https://www.medianama.com/2009/07/223-e-choupal-itc-scaled-down-commodities-launched-tamil-portal-in-fy09/ ↩︎
42. IDH, ‘IDH Joins Agri-Entrepreneur Growth Foundation as Core Partner’ (AEGF is a collaboration of Tata Trusts and Syngenta Foundation India). https://idh.org/news/idh-joins-agri-entrepreneur-growth-foundation-as-core-partner ↩︎
43. Hegde, N.G. (September 2021), ‘Role of NGOs in transforming agri-business scenario in India’, Indian Farming 71(9), pp. 22 to 24, Indian Council of Agricultural Research. The author is with BAIF Development Research Foundation. https://epubs.icar.org.in/index.php/IndFarm/article/download/118465/45706/309624 ↩︎
44. TechnoServe, ‘Integrating Farmers into Corporate Supply Chains’ (describes a Walmart Mexico Foundation funded initiative; NGO partnership principle). https://www.technoserve.org/blog/why-partnerships-are-key-to-integrating-smallholders-in-corporate-supply-ch/ ↩︎
45. Mathematica (6 September 2025), Developing Inclusive Agricultural Markets in Odisha, India: Evaluation of the Agricultural Production Cluster (APC) program, prepared for the Gates Foundation; mixed-methods evaluation, programme period 2020 to 2024. https://www.mathematica.org/publications/evaluation-of-the-agricultural-production-cluster-apc-program ↩︎
46. Mathematica (2025), APC evaluation (full reference at note 45). ↩︎
47. Bharat Rural Livelihoods Foundation (BRLF), Request for Proposal: Impact Assessment of Agriculture Production Clusters in Odisha (describes BRLF as an autonomous organisation under the Ministry of Rural Development and the collaboration with the Government of Odisha, PRADAN and 17 CSO partners). https://www.brlf.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/RFP-Impact-Assessment-APC-Odisha.pdf ↩︎
48. PRADAN, ‘Promotion of Agriculture Production Clusters (APCs) in Tribal Regions of Odisha’ (programme design: producer groups of about 150 farmers, about 40 contiguous acres, 20 to 25 groups per producer company). https://www.pradan.net/?p=9869 ↩︎
49. Mathematica (2025), APC evaluation (full reference at note 45). ↩︎
50. Dunn, E., Schiff, H. and Creevey, L. (February 2011), Linking Small-Scale Vegetable Farmers to Supermarkets: Effectiveness Assessment of the GMED India Project, microREPORT #166, prepared for ACDI/VOCA with USAID funding; summary at BEAM Exchange. https://beamexchange.org/resources/781/ ↩︎
51. Eaton, C. and Shepherd, A.W. (2001), Contract Farming: Partnerships for Growth, FAO Agricultural Services Bulletin 145, Chapter 2, ‘Key preconditions for successful contract farming’. https://www.fao.org/3/y0937e/y0937e04.htm ↩︎
52. RBI Bulletin, February 2025 (Das et al.) (full reference at note 1). ↩︎
53. PRADAN, APC programme design page (full reference at note 48). ↩︎
54. FAO Bulletin 145 (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001), Chapter 2 (full reference at note 51). ↩︎
55. FAO Bulletin 145 (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001), Chapter 1 (full reference at note 6). ↩︎
56. FAO Bulletin 145 (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001), Chapter 2 (full reference at note 51). ↩︎
57. FAO Bulletin 145 (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001), Chapter 2 (full reference at note 51). ↩︎
58. Nestlé India, farm economics page (full reference at note 18). ↩︎
59. Business Standard, 4 October 2024 (full reference at note 4). ↩︎
60. Incofin (2026), Sahyadri Farms interview (full reference at note 24). ↩︎
61. Das, R. et al. (2024), ‘Price Dynamics and Value Chain of Fruits in India: A Study of Grapes, Bananas and Mangoes’, RBI Working Paper Series No. 06 (DEPR 06/2024), 3 October 2024, Reserve Bank of India. https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=22721 ↩︎
62. RBI Working Paper No. 08 (Roy et al., 2024) (full reference at note 3). ↩︎
63. Business Standard, 4 October 2024 (full reference at note 4). ↩︎
64. CEEW e-Choupal case study (full reference at note 16). ↩︎
65. RBI Bulletin, February 2025 (Das et al.) (full reference at note 1). ↩︎
66. Rysentia (October 2026), Company Profile, ‘Illustrative Use Cases’. These are Rysentia’s own illustrative cases and are not independent evidence. ↩︎
67. Rysentia Company Profile (October 2026) (full reference at note 66). ↩︎
68. Tewari, Ghosh and Sangwan (2012) (full reference at note 7). ↩︎
69. FAO Bulletin 145 (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001), Chapter 1 (full reference at note 6). ↩︎
70. FAO Bulletin 145 (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001), Chapter 1 (full reference at note 6). ↩︎
71. CEEW e-Choupal case study (full reference at note 16). ↩︎
72. Business Standard, 4 October 2024 (full reference at note 4). ↩︎
73. Rysentia Company Profile (October 2026) (full reference at note 66). ↩︎
74. Rysentia Company Profile (October 2026) (full reference at note 66). ↩︎
75. Rysentia Company Profile (October 2026) (full reference at note 66). ↩︎
76. Ministry of Agriculture parliamentary reply on the Model Act, 2003 (full reference at note 8). ↩︎
77. Business Standard (IANS), 24 April 2017 (full reference at note 9). ↩︎
78. RBI Bulletin, February 2025 (Das et al.) (full reference at note 1). ↩︎
79. Tewari, Ghosh and Sangwan (2012) (full reference at note 7). ↩︎
80. Biswas and Tortajada (2015) (full reference at note 17). ↩︎
81. Incofin (2026), Sahyadri Farms interview (full reference at note 24). ↩︎